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W I T T G E N S T E I N  O N  S E N S A T I O N  A N D  ' S E E I N G - A S '  
But I said that I was going to distinguish two expres- 
sions, one for the 'surface' and one for 'what is below 
the surface' - only remember that these expressions 
themselves correspond just to a picture, not to its 
usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is just the 
surface and nothing underneath it, as that there is 
something below the surface and that there isn't just 
the surface. 1 
Al though Wittgenstein 's  philosophy of mind has given rise to a vast  
body of critical literature, his discussion of sensation has so far received 
only piecemeal  treat$nent. In fact, the focus of commenta tors  has been 
so much  on the pr ivate- language argument  that  it may  appear  as if 
Wittgenstein had little else to say relevant  to the topic of sensation. 
Al though I shall of course pay heed to that argument ,  my main concern 
is to sketch an overview of Wittgenstein 's  approach to sensation. One  
special virtue I should like to claim for it is that it provides some 
important  thematic continuity between the two parts of the Philosophi- 
cal Investigations. 2 Another  feature is that  it avoids imputing to 
Wittgenstein various traditional philosophical doctrines which some of 
his critics, as well as some of his followers, claim to find in the later 
writings. 
I have  just suggested that  Wittgenstein 's  account  of sensation is 
significantly different f rom what may be found in traditional philoso- 
phical theories. Nevertheless,  some writers have  viewed Wittgenstein as 
adopting a behavioristic analysis of mental  phenomena;  others have  
credited him with preserving private,  inner mental  p~ocess, and intro- 
ducing 'cri teria '  to bridge the gap between mind and behavior.  If what I 
have to say in the first par t  of this essay is correct ,  it follows that both  of 
these interpretations are fundamental ly in error,  and that  both  errors 
have a common  source. 
In Part  II ,  I argue that a proper  understanding of Wittgensteid~s 
approach  to sensation requires careful attention to his discussion of 
'seeing-as ' .  The  same point, I believe, could also be made  concerning 
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his approach to other mental phenomena, but space permits only a hint 
of the argument for that conclusion. 
1 .  D E S T R U C T I O N  O F  T H E  T R A D I T I O N A L  V I E W  
At the beginning of the Blue Book, Wittgenstein takes note of 'one of 
the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us 
look for a thing that corresponds to it'. 3 And it is certainly true that 
major philosophical efforts have been directed toward answering such 
questions as 'What is a sensation?' or 'What is a pain?' Once these 
questions are posed, the structure of ensuing philosophical discussion is 
pretty well fixed. For the question itself contains the assumption that 
sensations (or pains) must consist in something, and that the task of 
philosophy is to say what that 'something' is. This assumption is the 
common property of dualism and reductive materialism, and such 
theories constructed on its basis are excellent examples of what 
Wittgenstein refers to as Luftgebiiude (PI 118). 
According to a Cartesian view of mind, sensations are inner goings- 
on, knowable and nameable by their possessor, and logically inac- 
cessible in both respects to any outside observer. Sensation discourse is 
therefore held to be necessarily unintelligible to anyone except the 
sensation's owner (PI 243). Underlying this view is the assumption that 
the question 'What is a sensation?' is legitimate - legitimate in the sense 
that a convincing answer would specify the entities which are sen- 
sations. And it is precisely this assumption which Wittgenstein wishes to 
attack. The attack has two components. One of them consists in taking 
the assumption at face value, and showing that it leads to insuperable 
problems. The other argues that the assumption itself is fundamentally 
misconceived - that it arises out of a failure to understand the grammar 
of sensation words. Although I want to focus largely on the latter 
strategy, I shall begin by giving a description of the former. 
Let us assume for a moment that the philosophical picture of 
sensations as private, inner processes (states, objects) is correct. Al- 
though my sensations are inaccessible to others, they are at least held to 
be manifest to me. But if this is so, it should follow that I can name my 
sensations as they occur, and recognize them when they subsequently 
reappear. Wittgenstein's celebrated private language argument is 
directed against this very point: 
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Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign 
down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation - and so, as it 
were, point to it inwardly. - But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A 
definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. - Well, that is done precisely by 
the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion 
between the sign and the sensation. - But 'I impress it on myself' can only mean: this 
process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the 
present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going 
to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'. (PI 
258, cf. NFL 296 and BB 69, 172) 
T h e  point  here  is not  that  m e m o r y  can be unreliable,  but  ra ther  that  the 
ostensive p rocedu re  just  descr ibed fails to pick ou t  anything;  afortiori, 
it fails to p ick  ou t  anything which could  be r emembered .  4 ' W h e n  one  
says " H e  gave  a name  to his sensat ion"  one  forgets  that  a great  deal of 
s tage-set t ing in the l anguage  is p resupposed  if the mere  ac t  of naming  is 
to make  sense '  (PI 257). If, for  example,  I look  up into the air and say 
' T h e  sky is m o o ' ,  I have  not  by that  c e r e m o n y  accompl i shed  anything 
which  could  later be charac te r ized  as ' r emember ing  the mean ing  of  
,~moo ~, , 
Thus  far, the p rob lem with pr ivate  ostensive definition seems to have  
a coun te rpa r t  in public ostensive definition: the mere  u t te rance  of a 
sound  in the p resence  of an ob jec t  does not  serve to de te rmine  the use 
of that  sound.  5 Never theless ,  public ostensive definitions, assisted by 
addit ional  features,  do  eventual ly  succeed ;  the appl icat ion of  a sound  in 
the public arena  is p rov ided  by a var ie ty  of c i rcumstances  in which it is 
ut tered.  A m o n g  o ther  things, the public speaker  must  be  able to specify 
the ob jec t  receiving ostensive definition. One  way in which  he can  do 
this is by  using kind-words.  But  ' sensat ion '  will no t  work  as a k ind-word  
for  the private theorist ,  since it is b o r r o w e d  f rom the public domain.  
A n d  any puta t ively  pr ivate  k ind-word  would  mee t  the original  difficulty 
conce rn ing  pr ivate  ostensive definition (cf. PI 261). 
B e y o n d  specification of  the ob jec t  to be defined, another  necessary  
condi t ion  of  a sound ' s  being a name  is consistency in usage.  A n d  what  
counts  as consis tent  usage  or  (equivalently) a rule of  appl icat ion is 
de t e rmined  by f iuman ag reemen t  (cf. PI 224 on  the connec t ion  
be tween  these two concepts) .  Us ing  a term consistently,  like cont inuing  
a numer ica l  series correct ly ,  is a mat te r  of fol lowing the p rocedures  to 
which h u m a n  beings in fact  adhere.  Of  course,  a l though  h u m a n  
a g r e e m e n t  enters  into the situations where  sounds  are  invested with 
meaning ,  it need  neve r  be mentioned in those situations: 
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Our language-game only works, of course, when a certain agreement prevails, but the 
concept of agreement does not enter into the language-game. If agreement were 
universal, we should be quite unacquainted with the concept of it. 6 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the a g r e e m e n t  necessary  for l a n g u a g e  is no t  at b o t t o m  the 
resul t  of h u m a n  decisions: 
I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct 
but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a 
primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge 
from some kind of ratiocination. 7 
G i v e n  that  cons i s tency  in  app l ica t ion  is r equ i red  for a sound  to func t i on  
referent ia l ly ,  and  g iven  also that  what  coun ts  as cons is ten t  appl ica t ion  is 
d e t e r m i n e d  by h u m a n  ag reemen t ,  we can  be g i n  to see why s o m e o n e  
could  no t  successful ly m a k e  pr iva te  os tens ive  definit ions.  For  ' " o b e y -  
ing a ru le"  is a pract ice .  A n d  to think one  is obey ing  a rule  is no t  to 
obey  a rule .  H e n c e  it is no t  possible to obey  a rule  "p r iva te ly" :  
o therwise  th ink ing  one  was obey ing  a rule  would  be  the same th ing as 
obey ing  it '  (PI 202). I n  o ther  words,  s ince the ' p r iva te '  r ea lm rules  ou t  
the  possibil i ty of h u m a n  a g r e e m e n t  (its l anguage  is in  pr inc ip le  un-  
teachable)  it ipso facto excludes  a fea ture  essent ial  for d is t inguishing  
names  f rom r a n d o m  noises.  There fo re ,  na me s  of sensa t ions  cou ld  no t  
consis t  mere ly  if (private)  sounds  u t t e red  in  the p resence  of pr iva te  
objects .  T o  gene ra t e  a workab le  sensa t ion  l anguage ,  publ ic i ty  mus t  be  
b r o u g h t  in to  play. 8 
Suppose ,  however ,  tha t  s o m e o n e  has mas te red  the nonpsycho log ica l  
areas of publ ic  l anguage .  H e  knows,  then,  what  d is t inguishes  par t icu lar  
r a n d o m  sounds  f rom real  words  in his l anguage .  C ou l d  he no t  s imply 
ex tend  this knowledge  in to  the pr iva te  rea lm?  Wi t tgens t e in  considers  
this poin t :  
Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that exists only in our imagination. A 
dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also 
to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination? - 'Well, 
yes; then it is a subjective justification.' - But justification consists in appealing to 
something independent. - 'But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For 
example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to 
check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?' - No; 
for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image 
of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the 
correctness of the first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning 
paper to assure himself that what it said was true.) 
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Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of 
the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment (PI 265). 
Although this passage (like PI  258) is often interpreted as a comment 
on memory or as a commitment to Verificationism, its intention is 
actually quite different. Wittgenstein,s opponent is assuming that 
'subjective justification' means 'following the same procedure privately 
that I follow in cases of public justification'. But as we have already 
seen, the latter requires human agreement, and this is what is lacking in 
the private realm. The point can be made more clearly if we imagine 
what the 'table' in PI  265 might look like: 
Name Sensation 
EI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  -~ $1 
E2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ~ 82 
E3-'--- . . . . . . . . . .  ,-~, S3 
Now, even if one had a mental image like this, the problem still arises as 
to how it is to be used. For as P!  86 makes clear, tables are susceptible 
to various interpretations. 'But, '  someone may reply, 'since you have 
already granted a mastery of public (nonpsychological) language, the 
answer to this is obvious. You use the private table in the same way as 
you would use a public table.' ~, 
This suggestion, however attractive it first appears, turns out to be 
completely unsatisfactory. For what does it mean to do the same thing 
(cf. PI  350)? There is no general answer to this question, but in 
particular cases what counts as doing the same thing is (as has already 
been suggested) a matter of human agreement. But since the private 
table in PI  265 involves features which are assumed to be in principle 
incommunicable, there is no opportunity for human agreement to 
dictate that it is o r j s  not being used in the same way that public tables 
are used. Thus, the notion of subjective justification goes by the board, 
and the idea of consistent usage in the purely private realm is shown to 
be an illusion. The problem is not that a memory of the meaning of 'E '  
stands in need of verification, but rather that there is nothing which is 
the meaning of 'E' ,  and consequently nothing which is the memory of 
the meaning of 'E'. The mental image just depicted cannot be tested for 
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correctness because it is not a memory of anything. Even an infallible 
memory could provide no relief from this objection. 
The line of argument just outlined completes Wittgenstein's reductio 
ad absurdum of the name/object  sensation model. I want now to 
consider the second major component  of his attack on the traditional 
philosophical picture of sensations as inner processes. Here, the 
name/object  model is no longer granted for the sake of (a reductio) 
argument; rather, Wittgenstein seeks to exorcise that picture, which 
continues to linger in our thought. 
It has already been suggested that a major component of the 
Cartesian view of mind is the assumption that the sensations are entities 
of some sort which serve as the referent of sensation language. For if 
this were not the case, one might query, how could sensation language 
ever get under way? 
This question is the same as: how does the human being learn the meaning of the names of 
sensations? - of the word 'pain' for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected 
with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A 
childhas hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations 
and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. (PI 244) 
This passage is of great importance, but it has been given a variety of 
interpretations. Here I shall add mine. The first point to notice is that 
Wittgenstein does not set forth these ideas as a doctrine, but rather as 'a 
possibility' (eine Mtglichkeit). So regarded, the "possibility' shows us 
that as philosophers we are not required to regard sensation words as 
names for private inner events, and consequently that the picture which 
underlies the Cartesian outlook is one that can be rejected. There are, 
after all, no Cartesian private entities present in PI 244. What  we are 
given is merely a transition from spontaneous expressive behavior to a 
language-game which largely supplants that behavior. Notice also the 
context which surrounds PI 244: in PI 243 sensations are regarded ex 
hypothesi as private objects with private names, and in PI 245 we are 
reminded that such a view amounts to using ' language to get between 
pain and its expression'. The main purpose of PI 244 is to indicate that 
a perspective is available which does not drive a wedge between 
sensation and its expression. No doubt there are other perspectives 
which might accomplish the same end, but Wittgenstein's primary aim 
here is to remove a picture which dominates philosophical thought; not 
to insist on the propriety of some particular replacement. As Witt- 
genstein elsewhere remarks: 
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I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture CONSISTS IN 
his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this 
rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his Way of looking at things. (PI 144 or Z, 
461, capitalized emphasis added) 
The 'proposal' or 'new picture' in P! 244, therefore, amounts to a 
forceful rejection of the name/object sensation model. It need not be 
construed as bearing Wittgenstein's stamp of approval, however. 9 For 
language-games, it should be recalled, are 'set up as objects of com- 
parison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by 
way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities'. (PI 130, latter 
emphasis added) 
Both the primitive behavior and the linguistic behavior described in 
PI 244 involve the behavioral expression of sensation. Since this idea 
plays a central role in Wittgenstein's approach to sensation, I will soon 
consider it in some detail. Here it will be helpful to introduce a 
terminological convention. In what follows, I shall hyphenate 'expres- 
sion-of-sensation' as an indicator that the contained words cannot be 
treated as independently referential. 1° Thus, the question 'What entity 
is referred to by the name "sensation"?' is disallowed. In this respect, 
the phrase 'expression-of-sensation' has a grammar very different from 
that of superficially analogous phrases such as 'tomb of Tutankhamen'. 
The latter embodies a genuine distinction between inner and outer, but 
this picture will not give an accurate account of how 'expression-of- 
sensation' functions. The temptation to think that the phrases do have 
analogous uses is doubtless reinforced by the fact that some of their 
cognates also have superficially analogous grammars. For example, 
'Socrates has a pain' seems akin to 'King Tut has a curved spine', and 
since spines are (inner) objects which can be named, it might be 
assumed that in some similar way pains are too (cf. BB 48-53; PI 
311-312). But expressions-of-sensation are not like signs which a 
shopkeeper might put on his door in order to indicate whether he is 
inside (cf. NFL 279-280). 
Still, the urge to think otherwise persists almost inexorably, and 
hardly abates with Wittgenstein's suggestion that we 'put the expression 
of our experience in place of the experience' (BB 184). For this again 
seems to thwart an important philosophical question about the nature of 
'sensations themselves', and perhaps even to reduce sensations to their 
expression: 
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'But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied 
by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?' - Admit it? What greater difference could 
there be? - 'And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a 
nothing.' - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was 
only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be 
said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. (PI 304) 
This passage is not as paradoxical as it first appears. Wittgenstein's 
claim that 'the sensation i t se l f . . ,  is not a something' is a way of saying 
that talk about sensation should not be construed on the name/object 
model. Thus, there is not a 'something' referred to by the traditional 
philosopher's phrase 'sensation itself'. On the other hand, a sensation 'is 
not a nothing', since in ordinary parlance it is perfectly correct to say 
things like 'I have a sensation of floating', or 'He has a toothache'. 11 
And these sentences are not about behavior: 
'But was I when a baby taught that "toothache" meant my expression of toothache?' - I 
was taught that a certain behavior was called expression of toothache. (NFL 293, 
emphasis added) 
In these behavioral circumstances, one will properly say 'He has a 
toothache'; for Wittgenstein, this is a brute fact, and there are no 
residual questions about an entity referred to by 'toothache'. 
On the interpretation that I have offered thus far, Wittgenstein's 
philosophical approach appears to be essentially destructive. He is 
clearly sympathetic to the urges which have produced traditional 
philosophy, but he regards them as springing from misconceptions 
deeply rooted in language. This is a radical view, but here it is easy to 
misconstrue Wittgenstein, and to think that he is putting forth some- 
thing like a traditional theory of mind. D. M. Armstrong, for example, 
regards Wittgenstein as a behaviorist, and it is very instructive to see 
how he reaches this interpretation. After quoting PI 580 ('An "inner 
process" stands in need of outward criteria') Armstrong writes: 
When Wittgenstein speaks of 'outward criteria' he means bodily behaviour. The phrase 
'inner process' refers to mental happenings of the sort that, prima facie, seem quite 
different from bodily behaviour: such things as thoughts and sensations. In saying that 
'inner processes' stand in need of outward criteria Wittgenstein seems to be saying that 
there is a logically necessary connection between the former and the latter. But if this is 
so, Wittgenstein seems committed either to asserting the existence of a logically necessary 
connection between 'distinct existences', which seems an implausible interpretation of his 
view, or else to saying that 'inner processes' are not really anything distinct from bodily 
behaviour, although there may be two different ways of talking about what men do. But 
this is a form of Behaviourism. 12 
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Armstrong's assumption is the following: either Wittgenstein believed 
that sensations consist in something inner, or he believed that they 
consist in something outer. But here Armstrong seems to be 'tricked' by 
the law of excluded middle - something that Wittgenstein cautioned 
against (cf. P!  352). The truth is that Wittgenstein embraced neither of 
Armstrong's alternatives. Instead, he wanted ultimately to dismiss the 
question 'are sensations inner processes or are they just outward 
behavior?' For the question itself forces our thinking into the wrong 
mold (cf. PI 308 on mental processes and behaviorism). 
Alan Donagan 13 gives an interpretation of Wittgenstein quite 
different from Armstrong's, but he too is (mis)guided by the question 
'Do sensations consist in inner processes or are they just outer 
behavior?'. Failing to realize that Wittgenstein rejected this question, 
Donagan attempts to provide Wittgenstein's answer to it. He correctly 
notes (pp. 335-336) that Wittgenstein did not endorse a dispositional 
analysis of sensation, but he then proceeds to the conclusion that 
. . .  a sensation is defined by reference to its external circumstances. Yet it is not, 
according to Wittgenstein, reducible to those external circumstances; for it is defined as 
their private and non-dispositional accompaniment. It follows that you and I correctly say 
that we have the same sensation, say toothache, if we both have something frightful that 
we would naturally express by holding and rubbing our jaws, by certain kinds of grimace, 
and the like. Whether the internal character of what is expressed in these ways is the same 
for you as for me is irrelevant to the meaning of the word 'toothache.' (p. 348, emphasis 
added) 
In other words, sensations are the inner objects to which sensation 
words in fact refer, although the nature of the inner object is irrelevant 
to determining the meaning of sensation words (cf. p. 345) - a 
suggestion which Wittgenstein explicitly rejects in PI 273-274. 
Donagan's account actually amounts to a 'beetle-box' view of sen- 
sation, with the stipulation that the beetle-box is not empty (cf. p. 347). 
Underlying Donagan's interpretation is the same assumption that 
Armstrong made: either Wittgenstein believed that sensations consist 
in something inner, or he believed that they consist in something outer, 
Indeed, all traditional attempts to elucidate the 'nature of sensation' are 
committed to that assumption. But Wittgenstein's point is that tradi- 
tional philosophy goes astray when it casts about for referents of 
sensation terms; instead, the emphasis should be upon the various 
language-games involving the expression-of-sensation. These games, 
of course, can be described, but once this is accomplished, there is 
358 C H A R L E S  E.  M. D U N L O P  
nothing further about sensation which can be said. 
Although my discussion so far has concentrated on Wittgenstein's 
rejection of a traditional view of sensation, there are nonetheless many 
positive suggestions to be found in his writings as well. In the next 
section I shall focus on Wittgenstein's conception of the way in which 
sensation sentences get their foothold. 
2 .  E X P R E S S I O N S - O F - S E N S A T I O N  A N D  ' S E E I N G - A S '  
One cannot find in the Philosophical Investigations any real theory of 
language acquisitiom Although there might be an inclination to regard 
PI 244 as containing such a theory, at least in embryonic form, I have 
argued that the main purpose of that passage is a negative one. 
Nevertheless, PI 244 most certainly hints at a view which Wittgenstein 
did endorse: the use of sensation sentences can only be learned in the 
context of human behavior (PI 257). When as children we stub our toes 
or skin our knees, we naturally cry out, and we are taught to say things 
such as 'My knee hurts' or 'There's a pain in my toe'. 'What I do is not, 
of course, to identify my sensation by criteria: but to repeat an 
expression. But this is not the end of the language-game: it is the 
beginning' (PI 290, cf. PI 244). Here, according to Wittgenstein, is 
where a child begins to learn the use of sensation language. What is 
learned are the circumstances in which various expressions are cor- 
rectly used. Learning the use of expressions containing 'pain', however, 
does not mean learning that the word 'pain' refers to an inner entity. 
Such a misconstruai, based largely on incorrect grammatical analogies, 
leads (as we have seen) to the conclusion that sensation language 
cannot be learned at all. The privacy theorist's 'explanation' of lan- 
guage mastery here contains the seeds of its own destruction. 
One can, however, ask what is involved when a child moves from 
repeating an expression to mastering its use. The answer, Wittgenstein 
believes, will embrace neither causal hypotheses (the framing of which 
properly belongs to scientific inquiry) nor logically necessary and 
sufficient conditions (which in this case do not exist). What can be given 
is a careful description of the relevant phenomena. I shall argue that 
there are illuminating parallels between Wittgenstein's discussion of 
how we operate with sensation sentences, and his discussion of the 
phenomenon 'seeing-as'. 
It is essential to my learning the use of first-person sensation 
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sentences, e.g., pain sentences, that others should regard my primitive, 
natural pain-behavior as an expression-of-pain. Others teach me to use 
the expression 'I am in pain' in just those situations where they are 
prepared to say to me 'You are in pain', or of  me 'He is in pain'. Of 
course, it does not follow that my mastery of sensation language 
consists in my learning to apply it to myself on the basis of observing my 
own behavior (cf. P I  357). The point is rather that a behavioral context 
is required in order for others to teach me how to apply sensation 
language to myseff. And the behavioral context, I want to suggest, is 
this: In order for me to learn the use of first-person sensation sentences, 
it is necessary that other people see certain of my prelinguistic behavior 
as an expression-of-sensation. 
A similar point governs my learning to apply sensation sentences to 
others: learning the use of second-person and third-person sensation 
sentences is commensurate with coming to see certain behaviors of 
others as expressions-of-sensation. And this is a matter not of in- 
ference, but of training. 
My proposal is that the capacity for seeing certain behavior as an 
expression-of-sensation is inseparable from linguistic capacity. As 
Wittgenstein points out, underlying these capacities is a 'primitive' or 
'prelinguistic' reaction (Z  541): e.g., 'to tend, to treat, the part that 
hurts when someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneseff is - 
and so to pay attention to other people's pain-behaviour, as one does 
not pay attention to one's own pain-behaviour' ( Z  540). This sort of 
primitive behavior might well be exemplified by a dog who licks the 
wounds of his whimpering mate. But it would be incorrect in such a case 
to say that the dog sees his mate's behavior as an expression-of-pain, 
though perhaps he does see it as an expression-of-distress. And if one 
says that a dog could tend to the wounds of his mate only if he saw his 
mate's behavior as expressive-of-pain, one would simply be making a 
'metaphysical' hypothesis. 
No doubt some clarification is needed here, since it may seem quite 
arbitrary to aver that a dog might see his mate's behavior as an 
expression-of-distress, but not as an expression-of-pain. This claim, 
however, is perfectly in line with Wittgenstein's idea that 'seeing-as' is 
not a 'purely sensory' phenomenon, but involves some conceptual 
mastery as well. (It does seem self-contradictory to say 'A  sees X as Y, 
but A does not have any concept of Y'.) Now, although philosophers 
sometimes equate mastery of concepts with mastery of language, this 
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assimilation is not made by Wittgenste.in. Nonetheless, he does suggest 
that absence of language capability places severe constraints on a 
conceptual repertoire (cf. Z 520). The point is brought out in PI 174 
through a contrast between a dog's believing that his master is at the 
door ,  and his believing that his master will come tomorrow. In the 
absence of language, there is simply not enough complexity in behavior 
to credit anyone with the latter belief. 
What behavior is required for ascribing to someone the concept of 
pain? Presumably, one would have to be able to indicate that pain is a 
sensation (not a number or a physical object), that expressions-of-pain 
differ in sometimes subtle ways from expressions-of-sorrow (Z 492), 
that pains can vary greatly in intensity, etc. Of course, someone struck 
with total paralysis while retaining consciousness may not be able to 
evidence knowledge of such distinctions, but his claim to the concept of 
pain then rests on his former demarcating abilities. And these are 
abilities which no dog possesses; once again, the required distinctions 
are not available outside of a linguistic framework. So, if 'seeing-as' 
requires conceptual mastery, any constraints on the relevant concepts 
in an individual's repertoire will equally be constraints on his 'seeing-as' 
abilities: 
In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base - now this as.apex, that as base. - 
Clearly the  words 'Now I am seeing this as the apex'  cannot  so far mean  anything to a 
learner  who has only just met  the concepts  of apex, base,  and so on. - But  I do not  mean  this 
as an empirical proposition. 
'Now he ' s  seeing it like this', ' now like that' would only be said of someone  capable of 
making  certain applications of the figure quite freely. 
T h e  subs t ra tum of this experience is the  mastery  of a technique.  (PI p.208) 
What is the 'experience' referred to here? Wittgenstein says that 
'"Seeing a s . . . "  is not part of perception' (PIp.  197), and also that this 
concept "has more than purely visual reference" (PI p.209). It does not 
follow from either of these claims, however, that perception is not part 
of 'seeing-as'; the latter claim suggests just the opposite. Although 
formulas make for a risky approach to interpreting Wittgenstein, the 
following may be helpful: to see X as Yis at least to see X, and to make 
an appropriate connection between X and something of type Y. What 
constitutes an 'appropriate connection' will vary with the circum- 
stances. On some occasions it may consist in believing the X to be a Y; 
such is often the case when hunting accidents occur. On the other hand, 
one may have no erroneous beliefs about the perceptual situation: a 
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person familiar with Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit  figure, and who can see 
it either as a duck or a rabbit, might make the appropriate connection 
by being able to subsume the elongated appendage under the concept  
'ear ' ,  and again under the concept  'bill'. Both of these examples 
emphasize Wittgenstein's point that in order  for A to see X as Y, A 
must have the concept  of Y. Notice, however,  that A is not similarly 
required to have the concept  of X. Since there is a de re reading of 'A  
sees X '  in ' A  sees X as Y' - namely, 'The  thing which is in fact X is 
something which A sees as a Y' - we may rest assured that atavists can 
see computers as totems. 
I have suggested that :the acquisition of sensation language is closely 
tied to seeing behavior  as expressive-of-sensation. Assuming that this is 
correct,  a fuller account  of 'seeing-as' becomes imperative. Consider 
the following drawing (cf. B B  162-163, PI p.194): 
Fig. 1. 
It is natural to describe this as a face. But if someone wants to 
emphasize that his experience of Figure 1 is something more  than an 
experience of seeing marks on paper, e.g., 
Fig. 2. 
he might well say: 'I  see the lines in Figure 1 as a face'. Now, there are 
several important points to be made here. First, the superficial grammar 
of expressions of the form 'A  sees X as Y' is misleading, for it wrongly 
suggests that somehow two objects (X  and Y) are involved in A's  
experience - e.g., that 'seeing lines as a face'  involves a visual 
comparison between a group of lines and an image of a human face (cf. 
B B  164, PI 604-605).  But this way of putting the matter  does not 
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correctly describe one's experience of Figure 1. The reason is that the 
words 'I see the lines in Figure 1 as a face' got their significance in our 
discussion through the introduction of Figure 2; thus, their purpose is 
not to describe some 'intrinsic feature' of the experience one gets in 
looking at Figure 1, but rather to distinguish that experience from the 
experience one gets in looking at Figure 2 .  TM 
In circumstances where no contrastive use is made of 'I see X as Y', 
the 'seeing-as' terminology is out of place. For example, consider 
Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture (PI p.194) and suppose that you 
have never noticed its double aspect; suppose that when shown the 
picture you always say that it is a rabbit. 
I should not  have  answered the quest ion ' W ha t  do you see here? '  by saying: 'Now I am 
seeing it as a picture-rabbit ' .  I should simply have  described my  perception:  Just  as if I 
had said 'I  see a red circle over  there '  - 
Never theless  someone  else could have  said of me: 'He  is seeing the figure as a 
picture-rabbit . '  (PI pp. 194-195) 
Here, the third-person use of 'seeing-as' is taken to be legitimate 
because there is a contrast which the speaker intends to make; he sees 
the double aspect of the duck-rabbit, whereas the other viewer does not 
(cf. Z 208). 
Given that the 'seeing-as' terminology is essentially contrastive, 15 
how am I to describe my perception of Figure 1 in those cases where no 
contrasts are intended? The answer, already suggested in the last 
quotation, will no doubt seem disappointing: My perception is described 
by my description of what 1see (cf. NFL 308, PIp. 195). This may sound 
like a truism, but it can still be misunderstood. Perceptual descriptions 
need not be (and rarely are) self-conscious introspective reports. They 
need not even involve any psychological terms. Wittgenstein once 
imagined a language-game in which people describe what they see, but 
without using the prefix 'I see'. He then asked: Could anybody say that 
what I call out is incomplete because I have left out to mention the 
person?!' (NFL 298). The intended answer is clearly negative. For, a 
person who looks at Figure 1 and says 'There is a face' has provided a 
description of his perception (we know from it what Figure 1 looked 
like to him), the absence of psychological terms notwithstanding? 6 
The discussion can now be applied to our use of sensation language. I 
have suggested that for Wittgenstein, learning to apply sensation 
language to others goes hand in hand with coming to see the behavior 
of others as expressive-of-sensation; and that learning to apply it to 
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oneself requires that others see some of one's (prelinguistic) behavior as 
expressive-of-sensation. Thus, there are important similarities between 
(1) A sees B's [pain] behavior as an expression-of-pain; 
(2) A sees Figure 1 as a face. 
They involve (respectively) mastery of the concept of pain, and 
mastery of the concept of a face. In most situations, of course, a person 
would not describe his own perceptions by using the 'seeing-as' 
terminology. Rather, he would be expected to say: 
(1') B is in pain; 
(2') This is a face. 
It is also true that an observer would not normally describe A's situation 
using the terminology of 'seeing-as': just as I would not normally say 'I 
see this knife and fork as a knife and fork' (PI  p.195), I would not 
normally say ' A  sees B's behavior as an expression-of-pain'. But what 
then is the point of (1) and (2)? The answer is that they have a use if 
some contrast is intended. A n d  the contrast I have been stressing 
vis-a-vis (1)is between a prelinguistic phase where certain 'seeing-as' 
attributions fail to apply, and a linguistic phase where they do apply. 17 
Here, incidentally, a difference between (1) and (2) also emerges: the 
conceptual mastery associated with (1) is language-bound, while that 
associated with (2) is not. 
Although the conceptual skills embodied in language represent an 
important component of seeing behavior as an expression-of-sensation, 
Wittgenstein also stresses a nonlinguistic component. There is often an 
immediacy about seeing-as, which a focus on the side of conceptual 
mastery may tend to obscure: 
Suppose I said: 'It is not  enough  to perceive the  threatening face, I have  to interpret  it.' 
- Someone  whips out  a knife at me  and  I say ' I  conceive that  as a threat . '  ( Z  218) 
In making this joke Wittgenstein does not mean, of course, that looks or 
behavior can never~be interpreted, or that they are always unam- 
biguous. His point is that in fact it is frequently the case that no 
interpretation occurs (or is needed). And this is true despite the fact that 
the way in which we see human behavior is a function of the context in 
which it takes place. An upturned mouth may be seen as a smile, an 
imitation of someone else's smile, a contemptuous expression, etc. (cf. 
PI  539). But it does not follow from this that seeing someone's 
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expression as a smile involves any interpretation - even though 
someone may subsequently explain why he said 'A smiled' rather than 
'A imitated B's smile'. TM 
I have argued that there are some important parallels between 
Wittgenstein's account of seeing-as attributions, and his discussion of 
language learning and language mastery. The two themes are insepar- 
able in some important respects, but I have not meant to suggest that 
one is somehow more fundamental than the other. Without a capacity 
for seeing-as, there could be no mastery of language (psychological 
language being the main concern here), but equally, for a creature 
devoid of language, many seeing-as attributions would not be credible. 
The foregoing discussion quite obviously has not attempted to 
catalogue the large variety of ways in which sensation language 
operates. Clearly, a sentence like 'He is in pain' may perform many 
different functions: it could be used to display concern; inform a 
physician that the anesthetic has failed to work; warn someone that the 
dinner plates are hot; induce a bystander to assist the victim of an 
accident; prevent an attempt at first-aid by an incompetent amateur, 
etc. Furthermore, there are some major differences between the 
operation of first-person and third-person sensation sentences. In 
ignoring these facts I have not meant to imply that they are in- 
significant. Rather, my argument has had the more limited objective of 
showing that, for Wittgenstein, inasmuch as these facts are facts about 
sensation language, they are inseparable from the ability to see certain 
behavior as an expression-of-sensation. 19 
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